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INTRODUCTION
Over the course of his career, Professor Ronald Dworkin has earned a welldeserved reputation as one of the most penetrating and eloquent critics of
consequentialist theories of law, political morality, moral duties, and personal
ethics. In the ambitious and wide-ranging Justice for Hedgehogs, he offers an
alternative approach. Respect for human dignity, he says, entails two
requirements: (1) self-respect, i.e., taking the objective importance of your own
life seriously; and (2) authenticity, i.e., accepting a “special, personal
responsibility for identifying what counts as success” in your own life and for
creating that life “through a coherent narrative” that you have chosen.1
According to Dworkin, these two principles of dignity do triple duty. First,
as a matter of personal ethics, they provide guidance about what we should do
in order to live well.2 Second, they elucidate the rights that individuals have
against their political community.3 And third, they account for the moral
duties we owe to others.4
The principles of dignity that Dworkin identifies might play a valuable role
*

Professor of Law, The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in Law,
Boston University School of Law.
1 RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (forthcoming 2010) (Apr. 17, 2009
manuscript at 128, on file with the Boston University Law Review).
2 Id. (manuscript at 132).
3 Id. (manuscript at 210).
4 Id. (manuscript at 133).
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in these first two domains. But in this Comment, I will raise some doubts
about the value of this “dignity framework” in the third domain, in explaining
and grounding interpersonal moral duties. Specifically, the principles of selfrespect and authenticity sometimes fail to justify the nonconsequentialist
positions that Dworkin wishes to endorse. Moreover, even when these
principles do plausibly entail moral duties of a particular scope, that scope is
often significantly weaker, or in some cases significantly stronger, than many
nonconsequentialists would endorse.
In this Comment, I will focus on three illustrations of these difficulties:
Dworkin’s discussions of (1) the duty to rescue a stranger, (2) the duty not to
create an unreasonable risk of harm to others, and (3) the doctrine of double
effect.
Let me begin by putting these issues into the broader context of Dworkin’s
analysis of interpersonal moral duties. Dworkin makes highly ambitious
claims for his dignity framework, which, in his view, helps explain an
enormous range of nonconsequentialist views about our moral rights and
duties, including:
 Why I am permitted to care more about my children than about yours;5
 Why I am not required to undergo a significant sacrifice, such as
volunteering as a guinea pig for a medical experiment, simply because
this sacrifice is very likely to save many others from a similar risk of
harm;6
 Why I do not have a general duty to confer a benefit on others when
they could benefit more from an opportunity than I would;7
 Why I have only a limited duty to rescue a stranger from harm;8
 Why, in a rescue situation where I could save either one person or two
people in danger, (a) I am permitted to rescue only one, and (b) I am
permitted to do so even if my reason for selecting that person is
idiosyncratic;9
 Why deliberately harming another is almost always impermissible
while causing harm to another through competition is not;10
 Why, in determining how much risk of unintended harm I may
permissibly impose on others, we should not simply balance costs and
benefits in an economic calculus, but should instead balance: (a) the
extent to which taking a precaution against the risk will set back my
plans and prospects, against (b) the extent to which not taking that
precaution will set back the plans and prospects of potential victims;11
5

Id. (manuscript at 176).
Id.
7 Id.
8 Id. (manuscript at 176-79).
9 Id. (manuscript at 180-82).
10 Id. (manuscript at 183-86).
11 Id. (manuscript at 185-87).
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Why, generally speaking, killing someone is worse than letting him
die;12
 Why it is permissible to employ any of a wide variety of criteria for
selecting one potential recipient of an organ transplant over another,
but it is not permissible to kill a patient, even one who is already
dying, in order to harvest his organ, even if this would save a potential
recipient’s life;13
 Why we would also not permit people to agree in advance to a “spare
parts lottery” whereby they would allow others to kill them for their
organs in order to save multiple lives;14
 Why intentionally causing harm to another, either as a means or as an
end, is generally more wrongful than knowingly causing the same
harm as a side effect;15
 Why corporal criminal punishment, which takes away the criminal’s
control over his own body, is especially difficult to justify;16
 Why any form of criminal punishment demands an especially
compelling justification, for it permits the state to use the offender in
an effort to deter others, and this is only permissible when the offender
has genuinely forfeited the rights that his dignity would normally
demand.17
Dworkin also claims that his principles explain a number of plausible
positions that appear to be justifiable only by consequentialist reasoning. Of
course, Dworkin would very much like to defend these positions on
nonconsequentialist grounds. Here are some illustrations:
 Why it is permissible for one swimmer in danger of drowning to try to
outrace another and secure a life vest that can save only one;18
 Why it is preferable to save two drowning swimmers in one location
rather than one in another, when you cannot save them all;19
 Why, in such a case, it is not permissible to save one rather than two
for no reason other than whim;20
 Why it is permissible to turn a trolley so that it kills one person on the

12

Id. (manuscript at 183-86).
Id. (manuscript at 187-91).
14 Id. (manuscript at 188-91).
15 Id. (manuscript at 187-91).
16 Id. (manuscript at 192).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. (manuscript at 180-82).
20 Id. (manuscript at 181). Dworkin thinks it obvious that saving two rather than one is
the proper default choice, but he does not adequately explain why a weighted lottery (giving
the single swimmer a one-third chance of being saved) is not an equally plausible default.
See id.
13
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spur rather than five on the track ahead.21
There is much to admire in Dworkin’s analysis of these topics, including
intriguing juxtapositions, and fresh and illuminating examples. In this
Comment, however, I only have space to discuss the three topics identified
above: the duty to rescue a stranger; the duty not to create an unreasonable risk
of harm to others; and the doctrine of double effect. In each instance,
Dworkin’s discussion contains valuable insights, but his analysis and
conclusions do not flow easily from the dignity framework. The core problem,
we will see, is an unpersuasive extension of that framework from the domains
of personal ethics and political morality to the domain of interpersonal moral
duties.
I.

THE DUTY TO RESCUE A STRANGER

Dworkin’s analysis of the duty to rescue a stranger is problematic in two
main respects. First, his framework suggests that the scope of the duty to
rescue a stranger is extraordinarily weak, much weaker than many other
nonconsequentialists would favor. The framework implies that an actor need
not rescue if this would interfere with his idiosyncratic projects (e.g., to build a
temple to his god), so long as the stranger would not suffer serious harm if not
rescued.22 Second, Dworkin asserts, without persuasive argument, that if the
person in need of rescue is more identifiable, then one has a stronger duty to
rescue him.23
Let us consider Dworkin’s analysis in more detail. He begins by resisting
the argument for a very stringent duty to rescue. A mere failure to help
someone in need cannot, he says, “normally be interpreted as showing any lack
of respect for the objective importance of . . . [the potential beneficiary’s]
life.”24 The fact that I help my own children, but do nothing to help yours, is
consistent with my recognizing the objective importance of your children.25
Still, he cautions, one cannot completely ignore the claims of strangers.26 So, if
someone is drowning and I can easily save them, I might have a moral duty to
rescue.27
What is relevant to the scope of that duty? Three factors, according to
Dworkin – a metric of harm to the victim, a metric of cost to the rescuer, and
“confrontation.”28 But, Dworkin plausibly argues, if we are to provide a
genuinely nonconsequentialist account of the duty, we cannot simply balance

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Id. (manuscript at 188).
Id. (manuscript at 176-78).
See id. (manuscript at 180-81).
Id. (manuscript at 175).
Id. (manuscript at 176).
Id.
See id.
Id. (manuscript at 175-79).
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harm and cost against each other in a utilitarian way.29
What, then, is the proper nonconsequentialist analysis of these factors?
A.

The Metric of Harm to the Victim

Dworkin argues that a high threshold must be surmounted before a duty to
rescue is properly triggered: one has a prima facie duty to help a stranger only
when he is in danger of death or of losing the capacity to function as a normal
human being.30 The question, says Dworkin, is “whether denying him aid will
make it impossible for him to pursue value in his life at all.”31
This threshold requirement might well follow from Dworkin’s principles of
dignity, since those principles insist on the overriding moral significance of a
person’s ability to pursue objective value.32 But the requirement is extremely,
and implausibly, restrictive.
Suppose I know that the person in danger risks a broken leg but nothing
worse. I could save him yet face no risk of injury and no interference with any
of my own important life plans. It certainly seems that I should have a moral
duty to aid; yet Dworkin’s analysis suggests that I do not.33
Or suppose the harm is merely some form of temporary emotional distress.
A snake, which I know is harmless, is terrifying a child. I could easily pick up
the snake and toss it out of sight. Should I not do so?
It is certainly plausible to believe that I should have a duty of easy rescue
that is at least this robust. And that belief can be justified on other than purely
consequentialist grounds. To be sure, libertarian nonconsequentialists do
reject a duty to rescue.34 But not all nonconsequentialists are libertarians, and
some indeed endorse such a duty.35
29

See id. (manuscript at 176).
Id. (manuscript at 176-77).
31 Id. (manuscript at 177). See also id. (manuscript at 176), where Dworkin asks whether
“I have at least a prima facie duty to help a stranger when he is in danger of losing his life or
becoming incapable of functioning as a normal human being?” He later answers
affirmatively. Id. (manuscript at 177) (“We must ask . . . whether denying him aid will
make it impossible for him to pursue value in his life at all.”).
32 See id. (manuscript at 162-63).
33 To be sure, there is some ambiguity here in Dworkin’s exposition: whatever the
magnitude of the harm to the stranger, he says, my duty to prevent it “is greater when I can
do so with less risk to or interference with my own life.” Id. (manuscript at 177). This
might imply that he would require a more extensive duty to aid than is suggested in the text.
But he also seems to assume that I only need to act if the harm is “serious.” Id.
34 Consider Richard Epstein’s early writings. E.g., Richard Epstein, A Theory of Strict
Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 197-99 (1973) (asserting that rejection of common law
Good Samaritan doctrine and imposition of a duty to rescue would make it difficult to
establish the “limits of social interference with individual liberty”).
35 For example, many Kantian theorists endorse a duty of beneficence. Corrective justice
theorist Ernest Weinrib once endorsed a limited duty to rescue. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case
for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 251 (1980). Joel Feinberg suggests that a duty of
30
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The Metric of Cost to the Rescuer

This factor is also relevant, Dworkin argues.36 Here, again, Dworkin’s
framework justifies only an extremely weak duty, because the framework will
count as a serious cost whatever the rescuer takes to be a serious interference
with his important personal projects, even if no one else would view the
interference as a serious cost.37 As one illustration, Dworkin considers a
rescuer who is building a temple to his god.38 Now suppose that this rescuer
considers it critically important to finish building the temple by noon today
rather than two minutes past noon, because his god will otherwise be intensely
displeased. Then presumably he need not stop and save the child from the
terrifying snake, or from a broken leg, or perhaps even from a life-threatening
injury. This is not a very palatable conclusion.39
Dworkin might respond that I am taking his analysis and examples too
literally. Perhaps we should be permitted to balance potential harm to the
victim and cost to the rescuer more flexibly, according to some sort of sliding
scale: if the potential harm to the victim is quite significant, then, unless the
rescuer would incur comparably significant costs, he should still owe a duty of
easy rescue. Yet it is not clear whether Dworkin’s framework can justify this
more flexible approach, an approach that seems to collapse into the type of
utilitarian tradeoff that Dworkin undoubtedly means to reject. Most charitably,
we might assume that the more flexible metrics of harm to victim and of cost
to rescuer would still be fundamentally calibrated by the two principles of
dignity: both “harm” and “cost” would be defined substantially (though not
exclusively, given the problems I have just identified) by the extent to which
easy rescue is much more justifiable than a generalized duty to benefit others when one can
easily do so, because the duty to rescue is one instance of a duty to prevent another from
suffering harm. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, 130-50 (1984). Note the criticism of
Feinberg by Liam Murphy, Beneficence, Law, and Liberty: The Case of Required Rescue,
89 GEO L.J. 605, 627-30 (2001), who argues that failures to rescue are better understood as
failures to benefit.
36 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 177).
37 Id.
38 Id. Dworkin takes this example from T.M. Scanlon, Preference and Urgency, 72 J.
PHIL. 655, 659-60 (1975) (“The fact that someone would be willing to forego a decent diet
in order to build a monument to his god does not mean that his claim on others for aid in his
project has the same strength as a claim for aid in obtaining enough to eat . . . .”). Here, of
course, Scanlon is arguing that the idiosyncratic preference of the person in need of aid
(rather than the preference of the rescuer) is not morally decisive.
39 It is possible that Dworkin’s theory has more bite, however, in situations where A’s
reason for not aiding is neither (a) that aiding risks causing A significant harm (harm that
could interfere with his general pursuit of his life projects), nor (b) that aiding would
interfere with some specific project, such as completing his temple on time; but rather,
where A’s reason for not aiding is just (c) that A does not want to be bothered. Perhaps in
such a case, A must rescue, at least if the interference with the rescuee’s life plans is serious
enough.
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they interfere with the life plans of the victim or of the actor. Still, this revised,
more flexible balancing approach leaves critical questions unanswered. For
example, does “substantially” mean “significantly”? “Mainly”? “Almost
exclusively”? I am not confident that Dworkin can formulate a coherent
intermediate criterion, one that escapes both the Charybdis of implausible
deference to idiosyncratic personal projects and the Scylla of unacceptable
utilitarian balancing.
C.

“Confrontation”

According to Dworkin, the third factor that is relevant to the scope of the
duty to aid is “confrontation.”40 I have a stronger duty if either (a) the person
in need of help is a particular, identifiable person, or (b) the need to rescue
arises here and now, rather than at some physical distance or in the future.41
We would display a “callousness that mocks any pretended respect for
humanity,” says Dworkin, if we ignored the “impending death of a particular
person dying in front of us.”42
Dworkin points out that this third factor has “puzzled economists.”43 For
example, if a cave-in traps a miner, he says we expect the community to
“spend whatever further sums it takes” to rescue the miner.44 These sums
could amount to much more than we expect the community to spend ex ante on
mine safety in order to prevent cave-ins or other dangerous accidents from
happening in the first place.45 Dworkin treats the economists’ bafflement at
this disparate treatment as evidence that their cost-benefit analysis is out of
tune with common sense intuitions, intuitions that are better explained by his
nonconsequentialist principles of dignity.46
But I think nonconsequentialists should also be more than a little puzzled by
this phenomenon. Why should we treat the identifiability of the victim as a
moral feature of such dramatic significance? Dworkin’s only argument for this
position is that it is wrong to ignore the natural responses that a respect for life
provokes when we are directly confronted with a person facing imminent
death.47 But why give such enormous weight to that natural response, if, for
example, we could save five miners from being trapped and killed in the first
place, for every one trapped miner we spend enormous sums to rescue?
40

DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 178).
Id. (referring to “particularization” and “proximity” as the elements of confrontation).
42 Id. (manuscript at 179).
43 Id.
44 Id. Dworkin’s assertion that we would pay “whatever further sums it takes” to save
the trapped miner is an exaggeration. Id. We would not spend five-hundred million dollars
to save a trapped miner; and we do call off rescues of missing persons when the chance of
saving them is extremely low but greater than zero.
45 Id.
46 See id.
47 See id. (manuscript at 178-79).
41
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Perhaps our reluctance to treat their lives with equal respect is just a failure of
imagination.48
Elsewhere in Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin is exceedingly careful to
distinguish between fact and value, following David Hume.49 Why is he so
extraordinarily deferential to our “natural” reactions here?50 Could they not be
irrational, or even morally indefensible, as so many of our instinctive and
intuitive responses are? Consider the equally “natural” phenomenon of
disgust, which historically has played a troubling role in efforts to justify
racism and homophobia.51
Now, I concede that our intuitive response to the trapped miner is an
understandable emotional reaction, and one that psychologists have empirically
verified. Researchers have discovered, for example, that if study participants
are told, not just that a person in need is a child, but also the age of the child,
they are more likely to help; and their readiness to help increases even further
if the child is given a name.52 Perhaps evolutionary biologists can explain the
adaptive value of such intuitions. But the question remains: why should we
give weight to such reactions in justifying a stronger moral duty to rescue? A
better explanation should be offered than the simple fact that the reaction is a
“natural” one. We might “naturally” feel more compassion towards someone
if we know their first name, but that is hardly a justifiable basis for imposing a
stronger moral duty to rescue such a person.
Consider an analogous problem, the allocation of health resources to the
terminally ill. We currently allocate a huge amount of health expenditures to
end-of-life care, when those dollars could save many more lives if invested in
earlier prevention and treatment.53 Dworkin noted, in his Keynote Address at
the Symposium, that in the type of hypothetical insurance market he favors,
48 It almost seems that Dworkin embraces the intuition that identifiability of the victim is
morally salient just because it is a telling counterexample to what economic analysis would
suggest. But, it hardly follows from the fact that economists and consequentialists would
oppose a position, that nonconsequentialists should embrace it. The enemy of my enemy
need not be my friend.
49 Id. (manuscript at 19).
50 Id. (manuscript at 179).
51 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 1-4
(2004) (warning that the psychological reactions of disgust and shame, although
unavoidable, should not be the foundation of legal rules, in part because of the risk this
poses to stigmatized groups such as gays and the disabled).
52 Tehila Kogut & Ilana Ritov, The “Identified Victim” Effect: An Identified Group, or
Just a Single Individual?, 18 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 157, 157-65 (2005); see also
Deborah A. Small & George Loewenstein, Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim: Altruism
and Identifiability, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 5-14 (2003) (finding that even “weak”
identifiability increased the altruism of subjects).
53 See Reed Abelson, Months to Live: Weighing Medical Cost of End-of-Life Care, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2009, at A1 (referring to estimates that the United States could save $700
billion a year by reducing costs of end-of-life care).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1601467

2010]

TWO PRINCIPLES OF DIGNITY

109

distributive justice would probably allocate these health dollars very
differently.54 Yet the same could be said about the trapped coal miner. In
Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance market, we might well choose to invest more
in prevention of coalmine disasters and relatively less in rescues of identified
victims.
Of course, one important reason that we do spend too much on end-of-life
care is the factor of “confrontation” that Dworkin endorses. Your dying
mother or grandmother is in the hospital. You want her to get the best possible
care. You do not want a government “death panel” to tell you what to do.55
But again, does your natural feeling that society owes a special duty to
improve the health of this identifiable person really provide a convincing basis
for concluding that society indeed owes such a duty? If $200,000 would either
extend a terminally ill person’s life for a few months, or prevent several people
from contracting a debilitating lifetime disease, is the latter allocation not more
sensible and more humane?
To be sure, these allocation decisions are complex, and their ethical
resolution depends on more than simple cost-benefit analysis. Distributive
justice considerations are important, as is the moral obligation to continue the
care of a patient whom one has started to serve, even in circumstances where
discontinuing care and shifting resources to another patient would be more
cost-effective. More broadly, if you are “confronted” with specific individuals
in need here and now, very often you have much more reliable grounds for
judging that their need is genuine and compelling, that you can easily rescue
them, that others cannot help, and so forth; as compared to the much less
certain grounds you are likely to have for determining, ex ante, whether to take
a precaution that might save a diffuse, unidentified class of individuals in the
future. But Dworkin’s endorsement of the “confrontation” factor does not rely
on these contingent epistemic differences. Rather, he claims that the
identifiability and spatiotemporal proximity of a victim is an intrinsic moral
difference.56 This contention needs much more argument.
Finally, it is not even clear that Dworkin’s embrace of the “confrontation”
position – such as the view that we should pay whatever is required to save the
trapped coal miner – actually follows from his two principles of dignity. True
enough, our immediate emotional reaction when we witness the plight of
particular individuals in dire need of rescue is that we should save them. But
Dworkin provides no argument to show that this altruistic impulse, together

54 Ronald Dworkin, Keynote Address at the Boston University Law Review Symposium:
Justice for Hedgehogs (Sept. 25, 2009) (transcript on file with the Boston University Law
Review) (arguing that we should spend less “keeping people alive” at the end of their lives
because people could spend that money on useful activities throughout life instead of
financing expensive end-of-life care).
55 See Jim Rutenberg & Jackie Calmes, False ‘Death Panel’ Rumor Has Some Familiar
Roots, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2009, at A1.
56 See DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 178-79).
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with his two principles, entails a stronger moral duty to rescue those whose
plight is staring us in the face. He simply asserts that one displays a disregard
for the objective value of human life if one fails to spend enormous sums on
saving them, or if one fails to spend much more on saving them than on saving
less identifiable individuals through prudent ex ante precautions.57
II.

THE DUTY NOT TO CREATE UNREASONABLE RISKS OF HARM TO OTHERS

Let us turn to the second topic – the scope of the moral duty not to create an
unreasonable risk of harm to others. This is a topic that is of crucial
significance to the proper scope of tort law, and of some significance to
criminal law as well. Here, too, Dworkin’s principles of dignity suggest a
surprisingly narrow duty.
In determining the scope of this duty not to cause unintended harm, we
should not, Dworkin warns, simply engage in the sort of cost-benefit balance
that economists and consequentialists would recommend.58 Although now is
not the occasion for a full discussion of the problems engendered by a purely
cost-benefit analysis of risky conduct, I share Dworkin’s reservations.59
Trouble comes, however, when we examine the formula that Dworkin
recommends in lieu of cost-benefit analysis. He says we should balance:
(a) the extent to which the plans and prospects of a potential injurer will
be set back by his taking a precaution against risks
against
(b) the extent to which the plans and prospects of potential victims will
be set back if the actor does not take that precaution (and thus increases
the risk of injury).60
57

Dworkin’s arguments about the scope of our duty to alleviate global poverty are
similarly problematic. See id. (manuscript at 179). We do have such a duty, he says, given
the high need under the first metric and the low cost under the second, but he believes that
the factor of confrontation is still relevant: if we are more vividly aware of African poverty
today than in years past, due to extensive media coverage, this “aggravate[s] [our] failure of
duty” to respond to the problem, and we should feel more shame when we do not respond
adequately. Id.
But this view, taken literally, has bizarre consequences – for example, the greater the
media coverage of a natural disaster or of a poverty problem, the more funds we are morally
required to allocate towards alleviating the problem, even if we know that greater problems
exist elsewhere that the media have not highlighted.
58 See id. (manuscript at 187).
59 Kenneth W. Simons, Tort Negligence, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Tradeoffs: A Closer
Look at the Controversy, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1171, 1188 (2008) (rejecting as “highly
implausible” the use of unqualified consequentialist cost-benefit analysis as a criterion of
tort negligence).
60 See DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 186-87), stating that the Learned Hand test
is the correct basic strategy for determining when risk-creation is permissible, but endorsing
a restricted version of the test, under which we compare how much the actor’s projects and
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But now we have a problem reminiscent of the problem we encountered
with Dworkin’s analysis of the scope of the duty to rescue.61 Under this type
of a balance, the subjective importance of the potential injurer’s own plans and
projects will often override the rights of potential victims. Specifically, it will
override whenever the injury that the victims might suffer from the risky action
is modest or short-lived enough that it will not interfere in a comparable way
with the victims’ own long-term plans.
Consider two examples. First, recall the saga of our friend the templebuilder, who was in such a great hurry to complete his monument by noon
today. Now suppose that our friend is stuck in an unforeseeably horrendous
traffic jam. Once the traffic clears, he drives at a very high speed to the site of
his building. Speeding is the only way he can arrive at his destination on time.
Unfortunately, speeding will also terrorize dozens of young children along
the way. But, fortunately, their terror will only be momentary. His speeding
does not actually pose any risk of physical harm to them, and does not cause
any long-term emotional harm. So it does not set back their life plans or
prospects in any way. Still, is it really morally permissible for him to speed?
And should he not have a moral duty to compensate them for their emotional
harm?62
Now consider a second example, my own variation on a famous example
from T.M. Scanlon.63 Imagine Lopez is in the transmitter room of a television
station. Electrical equipment in the room poses a serious risk of falling on him
and causing him extremely painful shocks, though it will cause no other harm.
There is only one sure way to prevent him from suffering these shocks: turning
off the transmitter for fifteen minutes while we fix the problem. But the final
match of the World Cup is in progress, watched by a huge number of people,
and it will not be over for an hour. Should we turn off the transmitter now, and
save Lopez immediately? Or should we instead wait until the match is over?
Scanlon asks, in his similar example, an arresting question: “Does the right
thing to do depend on how many people are watching – whether it is one
million or five million or a hundred million?”64 Clearly, it does not. The
question nicely captures the nonconsequentialist intuition that it is not always
permissible to harm someone, or even to risk harm to them, simply because the
aggregate expected benefits derived from the conduct that causes or risks the

plans are set back by taking a precaution, relative to how much not taking the precaution
(and thus causing damage) would set back the projects and plans of others.
61 See supra Part I.
62 In tort law, of course, he would most likely not have a legal duty to compensate them,
since liability for emotional harm alone is imposed only in narrow circumstances not present
here. See DAN B. DOBBS, 2 THE LAW OF TORTS § 302 (2001).
63 For the original example, see T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 235
(1998). In Scanlon’s version, Jones is trapped under fallen equipment, and, in order to
rescue him, we must turn off the transmitter for fifteen minutes. Id.
64 Id.
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harm outweigh the expected costs.65 A huge number of tiny benefits might, on
a utilitarian metric, have greater aggregate value than the disvalue of a single
individual’s pain, and yet, in these examples, it is impermissible to choose the
course of action that produces those greater benefits.
Both Scanlon’s example and my example demonstrate that any balancing
test for permissible risk imposition should include a constraint against this type
of utilitarian aggregation.66 But I want to pose an additional question about my
scenario. Suppose that watching the World Cup live is extremely important to
the life plans of some of the viewers, indeed one of the most important
experiences in their lives.67 It would appear that under Dworkin’s view, such a
setback to the plans and prospects of these viewers weighs heavily, and could
easily override the substantial risk that Lopez might suffer significant but
temporary pain if we do not turn off the transmission.68 For it is quite possible
that the painful shocks that Lopez might suffer would set back his life plans
very little, if at all.69
The basic problem that both Scanlon’s example and my example reveal is
this: Dworkin employs a criterion of permissible risk imposition that places too
much value on whether the life plans of the relevant actors are substantially
furthered or hindered. Although these features might deserve some weight in
the rescue context, it is not at all clear that they should be so decisive in the
context of an actor imposing a risk of harm on a class of potential victims. In
this context, we need to weigh, not just what effect a rule permitting (or
forbidding) risky activity will have on the life plans of potential injurers and
victims, but also: (1) the way in which the benefits and burdens are distributed
and (2) the social value of the activity.70 As a matter of personal ethics, it may
be perfectly defensible for sports fans to devote significant portions of their
time to rooting for the home team. Indeed, such devotion might be laudable in
many respects, for it might build community spirit and reinforce such values as
valor, effort, discipline, self-sacrifice, and acceptance of defeat. But it hardly
follows that these values are entitled to significant social weight when pursuing
them requires endangering the welfare of others. By contrast, if the reason one
is endangering others is to save one’s own life or the life of another person

65

See id.
As stated, Dworkin’s balancing test does not include such a constraint, though it would
be easy enough for him to add one. See DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 187).
67 This is not an unrealistic assumption, I think, in light of the maniacal behavior of
sports fans around the world.
68 See DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 187).
69 Perhaps one could distinguish this second example from the first because the sports
fans are not literally the injurers, but are people who benefit from the injurer (the TV
station) not taking a precaution. But I am not so sure that this matters. Would it really
make a moral difference if the TV station owner also was a rabid sports fan and considered
this experience of watching the World Cup final the highlight of his year?
70 Simons, supra note 59, at 1191-92, 1202-08.
66
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(e.g., by transporting the needy person at high speed to the hospital), that
reason has significant weight both in personal ethics and in interpersonal risk
imposition.
How would Dworkin respond to these criticisms? Perhaps he would say
that permitting either our friend the temple builder or the TV station owner to
impose these risks on others is unjustly asking the victims to “subsidize” the
injurer’s choice of life project.71 This is indeed a valid concern. However,
what counts as an unjust subsidy is a notoriously difficult inquiry,72 and it is
not clear how one would apply the concept here. Can I not take a drive for
pleasure, at a careful rate of speed, even though this endangers pedestrians to a
slight extent? Why are they not thereby “subsidizing” me? After all, they
might not consent to the risks, nor benefit in any direct way from those risks.
Moreover, Dworkin’s two principles of dignity are not a promising source for a
plausible account of what constitutes an “unjust subsidy” in this context.
One other portion of Dworkin’s analysis deserves attention. Before
introducing his formula for permissible risk-imposition, Dworkin places the
question of liability for unintended harm within an illuminating framework.
He suggests that we must find some middle ground between the actor always
paying for the risks he imposes on others (an option that takes away our
control by burdening our ability to act), and always leaving the cost of the risks
he imposes on the others (an option that takes away our control by leaving us
at the risk of being victims).73
I agree with Dworkin that a middle ground between pervasive liability and
no liability must be sought. I also agree that each extreme would result in an
excessive burden on personal liberty. But I do not agree that focusing on the
effect of a liability rule on the actor’s or the victim’s degree of control over his
life is a helpful way to determine the permissible scope of risk-imposition, for
two reasons. First, it is dubious that “maximizing control”74 is the only or even
71 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 132, 177). Elsewhere in Justice for Hedgehogs,
Dworkin’s analysis of what political justice does and does not require implicitly employs
the idea of an unjust or undeserved subsidy. See id. (manuscript at 221-27).
72 For discussions of this topic in the context of unconstitutional conditions, see Seth
Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U.
PA. L. REV. 1293, 1294-300 (1984); Kenneth W. Simons, Offers, Threats, and
Unconstitutional Conditions, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 289, 292-94 (1989); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV L. REV. 1413, 1415-19 (1989).
73 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 186). For an analysis along similar lines from a
prominent tort scholar suggesting that tort law balances the interests in liberty and security,
see Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 311, 382-84 (1996).
74 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 186) (“My goal is to maximize my control; that
is what my ethical responsibility for my own life demands.”). It is surprising that
Dworkin’s criterion here employs “maximization,” since his purpose is to supply an
alternative to the utilitarian “maximization of utility” criterion. Id. (manuscript at 209). To
be sure, he wants to maximize “control,” not “utility.” Still, many nonconsequentialists
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the most important criterion for determining the defensible middle ground,
either in morality or law. For example, whether the risk is fairly distributed is
also critical, as noted above. Indeed, even in a purely intrapersonal case in
which all the advantages and disadvantages of taking the precaution inure to
the actor (e.g., a hermit is deciding how carefully to build a house that no one
else will visit), the decision about what level of care to adopt should not
depend on whether that level will “maximize control.”
Second, even if control is the proper criterion, I do not see how it entails the
type of balancing test that Dworkin endorses. Under Dworkin’s analysis, the
balancing formula tells us when it is wrong for us not to take more care.75 For
example, he asserts: “It would destroy my life, not enhance it, if I were to take
as much care as is possible not to harm others. I could not even cultivate my
garden.”76 But the issue of when an actor should compensate for risk is
distinct from the question of when it is morally permissible to impose that risk.
It is an open question whether one who permissibly cultivates his garden with
particular chemicals or a particular irrigation method should nevertheless pay
for the harm that he thereby causes. Strict liability, which Dworkin does not
discuss, is a liability option, one that the Anglo-American common law
occasionally employs. And if the strict liability rule that is adopted will only
rarely result in liability, it need not be especially burdensome, and thus need
not significantly affect the “control” that the actor has over his life.77
III. THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT
The last topic to be explored is Dworkin’s attempt to make sense of the
controversial doctrine of double effect (“DDE”). Under this deontological
doctrine, intentionally causing harm (either as a means or as an end) is more
difficult to justify than knowingly causing the same harm as a side effect of
what one intends.78 Consequentialists, of course, would not draw such a
distinction, but would instead focus on whether the action taken minimized net
harm, without regard to whether the actor intended the harm or merely knew

criticize any form of maximization.
Moreover, why does Dworkin focus here on “control”? Perhaps this is a result of his
analysis of free will earlier in the book, see id. (manuscript at 137-60), or of his antisubjugation principle, which I discuss in the next section. But it is unwise to employ an
undifferentiated concept of “control” in all of these contexts. Distinct conceptions of
“control” are actually at work.
75 Id. (manuscript at 186-87).
76 Id. (manuscript at 186).
77 Kenneth W. Simons, The Restatement (Third) of Torts and Traditional Strict Liability:
Robust Rationales, Slender Doctrines, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1355, 1356 (2009).
Similarly, the fact that almost all tort liability is insurable means that even a very expansive
negligence or strict liability rule need not be a severe burden on actors.
78 See DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 187-88).
In some versions of DDE,
intentionally causing harm is categorically forbidden. Id (manuscript at 187).
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that it would occur.79
Here are two of Dworkin’s supposed illustrations of DDE:
(1) Liver transplant:
(a)It is permissible for a doctor to save one of two patients who each
need a liver, when only one liver is available, even though he knows
that the other patient will thereby die; but
(b)It is not permissible for a doctor to kill an elderly patient who will
die of his illness in a few weeks, for the purpose of extracting his liver
to save another patient, one with a much greater life expectancy, who
will otherwise die.80
(2) Trolley:
(a) It is permissible to turn a runaway trolley headed towards five
people who lie immobilized on the track, even though the actor knows
that by turning the trolley onto a spur, he will cause the death of one
person who lies immobilized on the spur; but
(b) It is not permissible, if no spur exists, to throw onto the track a
large stranger who is fortuitously passing by and whose bulk suffices
to stop the trolley from killing the five.81
After pointing out that deontologists have not had an easy time justifying
DDE,82 Dworkin asserts that his principles of dignity both explain these
illustrations and offer a persuasive justification for DDE. Alas, neither
assertion is convincing.
According to Dworkin, his second principle of dignity forbids one person
from imposing a decision on another person about how that other person’s life,
person, or property should be put to the service of others.83 If you divert the
trolley onto the spur and cause the death of one rather than five, he says, you
do not “impose a decision” in that impermissible way; but if you push the fat

79

See JORAM GRAF HABER, ABSOLUTISM AND ITS CONSEQUENTIALIST CRITICS 10 (1994)
(“[C]onsequentialists hardly think kindly of the D.D.E. convinced as they are that
consequences alone determine right conduct.”).
80 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 187-88).
81 Id. (manuscript at 188-91). The trolley problem was introduced by Philippa Foot. See
PHILIPPA FOOT, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, in VIRTUES
AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 19, 23-31 (Oxford Univ. Press 2002)
(1978). Judith Jarvis Thomson made the problem famous. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, The
Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395, 1395-415 (1985).
82 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 189) (“[Some] philosophers say that it is
always wrong to aim at someone’s death no matter what the gain. That explains our
reactions to the transplant and trolley examples, they say . . . . But that explanation simply
restates the problem. If someone’s motives are good – to save as many people as possible –
why should it matter whether he actually aims at the death of a smaller number or simply
knowingly produces their death?”).
83 See id. (manuscript at 133-34).
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man into the path of the trolley so that his body serves as a brake, you
improperly “impose a decision” on him.84
But this anti-usurpation argument fails, both descriptively and normatively.
Although some private interpersonal moral duties not to interfere with
another’s rights do rest on the other’s right to make an autonomous decision,85
the type of cases we are considering are not within this category. In both
trolley scenarios, the actor ignores the victim’s likely (or even expressed)
wishes. Thus, suppose the actor can reach the person on the spur by cell
phone; it is doubtful that turning the trolley is permissible only if that person
verbally consents. What distinguishes the two trolley cases is not any
difference in whether the actor imposed his decision on an unwilling victim,
but instead differences in the actor’s causal responsibility for the harm, or in
the nature of his commitment to harming or involving the victim.86
At several points, Dworkin does hint at such deeper differences. For
example, he frames the question as whether the actor imposed a decision
“about whether and how [the victim’s] life should be put at the service of
others.”87 In another instructive passage, Dworkin states:
Of course you are not entitled to take even small risks with my children’s
lives for the thrill of it. But you are entitled to drive with normal care in
my street even though this measurably increases the risk of harm to them.
The difference explains much else: warring nations may be entitled to
bomb enemy munitions factories knowing that innocent civilians will be
blown apart. My children playing in the street and civilians living near
enemy factories are in the wrong place at the wrong time; they suffer bad
luck if they are harmed but no one has judged that it is desirable that they
should suffer it.88
But in both of these passages, Dworkin’s language merely restates, rather
than solves, the problem of how to justify DDE. The first passage hints that
using someone as a means is what is especially troubling. The second hints
that intention to harm is the morally relevant feature. Each passage reinforces
the point that the anti-usurpation principle alone is not the operative
principle.89
84

See id. (manuscript at 188-91).
One example is a doctor’s duty not to provide medical care to a patient unless she has
the patient’s consent. Id. (manuscript at 189).
86 The person turning the trolley merely diverts the path of a threatening object; but the
person pushing the fat man is committed to using or appropriating the victim’s body as a
mean to the end of saving the five. For two recent, valuable discussions that try to refine
and more deeply justify this distinction, see F.M. KAMM, INTRICATE ETHICS: RIGHTS,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND PERMISSIBLE HARM 138-76 (2007); T.M. SCANLON, MORAL
DIMENSIONS: PERMISSIBILITY, MEANING, BLAME 18-20 (2008).
87 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 191) (emphasis added).
88 Id. (manuscript at 189-90) (emphasis added).
89 Dworkin at one point suggests that what is impermissible is relying on a justification
85

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1601467

2010]

TWO PRINCIPLES OF DIGNITY

117

Dworkin does offer one other formulation that purports to distinguish the
(permissible harm) “turning of the trolley” case from (impermissible harm)
cases of true usurpation: “[W]hat is forbidden in all these cases [of
impermissible usurpation] is not that someone’s body be invaded or harmed
but that this be done in service of a judgment about how his body should be
used.”90 But this criterion also fails to explain the different outcomes. If “a
judgment about how his body should be used”91 means “an (impermissible)
judgment that his body must be used as a means or end rather than side-effect,”
then this merely restates and does not justify DDE. However, if that phrase
means “an (impermissible) judgment that the victim will not endorse about
how his body will be used,” the criterion fails to distinguish means and ends
from side-effects at all, because in all of these scenarios, the injured victim
might well object to the ultimate judgment that his welfare must be sacrificed
for the sake of a larger good.
To be sure, Dworkin’s legitimate concern to preserve autonomy, and
specifically to preclude others from unjustifiably usurping a decision, has
genuine traction in the context of political morality.92 It is indeed especially
troublesome when the government overrides the choices of its citizens, not just
because the government thereby seeks to avoid harm to others or to provide
social benefits, but because the government rejects on the merits the morally
permissible choice that the citizen exercises. As Dworkin explains:
Even those who believe that pregnant women should have themselves

that “suppose[s] my right to decide what it is desirable should happen to you.” Id.
(manuscript at 190) (emphasis added). But this broad criterion, too, is unpersuasive. Even
in the scenario where the actor turns the trolley, this criterion is, in one sense, satisfied: we
believe that the state of affairs in which the trolley is turned is a better state of affairs, from
either a deontological or consequentialist perspective, than the state of affairs in which it is
not turned. Yet this is not the same as deciding that it is desirable that the person on the
spur should die or be harmed. And, on a narrower understanding of the criterion, even
pushing the fat man does not satisfy it. The actor choosing that unfortunately necessary
means to the end might greatly regret that he must use this harmful alternative. And again,
it is not the case that the actor who pushes the victim has decided that the best use of the
victim’s life is to sacrifice him to save five. Rather, the actor has decided to use the victim’s
body, and presumably would be delighted if the victim survived.
Notice, finally, that the likelihood that harm will ensue is not the decisive consideration in
deciding which of the courses of actions is morally permissible. Even if the fat man has
only a 50% chance of dying, while the person on the spur in the diverted trolley scenario
would have a 90% chance, using the fat man’s body as a brake arguably is impermissible
while diverting the trolley is not.
90 Id. (manuscript at 189).
91 Id.
92 See id. It also has importance in the context of personal ethics. See id. (manuscript at
133) (“We cannot escape influence, but authenticity [the second principle of dignity]
requires us to resist domination. The distinction is of great ethical importance: it is the
difference between limitation and subordination.”).
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tested so that a defective fetus might be saved by medical intervention
would be horrified if such tests and intervention were mandatory. People
have a right . . . that nothing be done to them that supposes that they are
not the final judges of how their bodies should be used.93
But Dworkin is on treacherous ground when he takes this plausible duty of
government not to usurp the decisions of its citizens and extrapolates it to the
domain of interpersonal moral duty, the duty of one private person to another.
The anti-usurpation principle is much less relevant in this domain, for two
reasons. First, private persons rarely have power over the decisions of others
that is remotely comparable to the power of government over its citizenry.
And second, private individuals ordinarily have the liberty to act for a wide
variety of reasons, including disagreement with the (morally permissible)
views, lifestyles, or life projects of other private individuals. It is morally
permissible for me to befriend only those who share my political views, or to
shun starving artists or wealthy hedge-fund traders, but it is certainly not
legitimate for the government to rely on such criteria in deciding who may use
or speak in a public park.
Another problem arises with Dworkin’s use of the second illustration. The
trolley problem is not clearly an illustration of DDE at all. It is not the case
that an actor who pushes or throws someone in the path of the trolley in order
to stop its motion must intend to cause death, or even harm, to the involuntary
human brake. If the victim happens to be wearing indestructible garb that
protects him from any physical harm, that would hardly set back the actor’s
plans (so long as the victim’s body will still stop the train). Thus, it is not the
case that the actor must have intended to harm the victim.94 In passing,
Dworkin implicitly recognizes this notorious problem with individuating
intentions. For example, he describes the “thrown bystander” variation as a
case in which “you throw one person onto the single track intending that he be
struck”;95 Dworkin does not say, “intending that he die or be injured.” And in
another scenario, in which an actor shoots another in order to obtain a needed
medicine, Dworkin acknowledges that what is really necessary to achieve the
actor’s end is (merely) that the victim “be in some way immobilized,”96 not
that the victim be killed or physically harmed.97

93

Id. (manuscript at 189).
Even in the liver transplant example, arguably the death of the elderly patient need not
be intended. The doctor could anesthetize the patient, remove his liver, and then hope
against hope that the patient miraculously survives. But many deontologists would concede
that in this type of case, what the doctor does intend to do (remove a liver from a patient
who needs it to survive) is “close enough” to intending the patient’s death that it should be
so considered for purposes of DDE.
95 Id. (manuscript at 188) (emphasis added).
96 Id. (manuscript at 189).
97 Dworkin pairs this example of an impermissible harming with an example of a
permissible harming that results in the same consequence, the death of the other. Dworkin
94
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Consider one final argument that Dworkin offers for the anti-usurpation
approach. If we switch from an ex post to an ex ante perspective on the liver
transplant problem, we could imagine that a group of individuals agree in
advance to a utilitarian “spare parts lottery”: they agree to a later involuntary
reallocation of human organs whenever this would produce a net saving of
lives.98 Why, Dworkin asks, is such an agreement still troubling and not
enforceable?99 The reason, he suggests, is that under the agreement you give
others authority to make basic decisions about your life when the time comes
for an organ transplant.100 Indeed, Dworkin says, in this respect, enforcing the
agreement is akin to enforcing an agreement in which you sell yourself into
slavery.101
This argument, though initially attractive, is overstated. We do sometimes
permit individuals to irrevocably give up their right to decide how their bodies
may be used. If you sign up for the Army and later, before your tour is up,
change your mind about exposing yourself to physical harm, you will suffer a
significant legal sanction. Or if you agree to play professional football but
later decide that the rewards no longer justify the risks of physical injury, you
will suffer a financial burden for exercising that choice. Still, Dworkin is
correct that a “spare parts lottery” agreement should not be enforced. But the
better explanation for this result is not a broad anti-subjugation principle, but
instead a narrower principle, that consent does not override all deontological
rights and duties.
In sum, Dworkin’s anti-usurpation principle, while it indeed flows from his
second principle of dignity, does not help justify DDE or any plausible variant
of DDE. (Nor does it justify the distinction between killing and letting die,
despite Dworkin’s assertion that it does.)102 Whether the victim has been fully
supposes that the actor and the other both need the medicine to survive a rattlesnake bite,
and the actor merely outruns the other and thus secures the medicine for himself, realizing,
however, that this will cause the other to die. See id. (manuscript at 183). Note that in this
example, as in the trolley and liver transplant examples, what is problematic is not that the
actor improperly supposes that he is the final judge of how another’s body or welfare should
be used. In both cases, the actor decides to save himself knowing that this will be at the cost
of the life of another. If the actor needing the medicine knows that he is very likely to
outrace the other, his choice to race and secure the medicine for himself does not, in any
meaningful sense, preserve the other actor’s right to decide for himself whether his life will
be lost.
98 See id. (manuscript at 188-89).
99 Id. (manuscript at 189).
100 Id. (manuscript at 191).
101 Id.
102 Dworkin asserts that the distinctions between killing and letting die, and between
deliberate harm and the harm that occurs as a result of legitimate competition, also are
explained by the anti-usurpation principle. Id. (manuscript at 183-86). Referring to the
rattlesnake bite scenario noted earlier, see supra note 97, Dworkin claims that there is an
important moral difference between killing someone to obtain a needed medicine and
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consulted, and whether the actor has made a decision that overrides the
victim’s judgment, are sometimes relevant, even decisive, considerations in
political morality. But only rarely are they prominent features of the
topography of interpersonal moral duties.
CONCLUSION
Dworkin plausibly rejects consequentialist accounts of interpersonal moral
duties. But the principles of dignity that he offers instead are an inadequate
alternative account. His general analysis of the duty to rescue justifies an
unduly weak duty. Although Dworkin would enlarge that duty when the
victim is identifiable or proximate, his argument for that enlargement is itself
insufficient. Dworkin’s analysis of the duty not to create an unreasonable risk
of harm encounters similar problems. By emphasizing the subjective
importance of the actor’s personal projects, he does not adequately constrain
the actor’s risky conduct, and he implausibly frames the question of
permissible risk-imposition as a question of what liability rule will “maximize
the control” of actors and victims. Finally, in his analysis of the deontological
doctrine of double effect, Dworkin invokes an anti-usurpation principle that
protects autonomous decision-making. But this principle fails to explain and
justify the distinction between intending harm as a means or an end, and
knowingly causing harm as a side effect of what one intends.
Dworkin’s “interpretive” account103 of interpersonal moral duties is
competing in a race for the medicine with that person:
But any general transfer of control over the integrity of my body, particularly to those
who do not have my interests at heart, would leave my dignity in shreds. Only when
we recognize that connection between dignity and bodily control can we understand
why killing someone is intuitively horrifying when letting him die, even out of the
same motive as we might have for killing him, is not.
Id. (manuscript at 185).
This argument flounders in ways that we have already encountered. Usurpation or
control is not the morally relevant difference in these cases. Note, first, that the
wrongfulness of killing someone (as opposed to letting someone die) often has nothing to do
with the victim’s lack of conscious control. A bomb can kill instantly, and thus not affect
the victim’s ability to control his fate; a failure to save a victim from drowning can result in
the victim helplessly flailing in the water for a considerable period of time, and thus
measurably compromise his control over his fate. Moreover, a particular killing method
could permit the victim some degree of control, and yet the method could thereby be more,
not less, horrifying and morally blameworthy. Thus, suppose murderer Marv places you
into a contraption that permits you the choice of killing yourself sooner or dying more
slowly and painfully. Murderer Max simply kills you suddenly. It is not obvious that Max,
by taking away your control, is more blameworthy, but that is what Dworkin’s analysis
suggests.
103 Dworkin purports to address the problems with a consequentialist account of
interpersonal moral duties within his comprehensive “interpretive” perspective. Id.
(manuscript at 79-119). I have not addressed his interpretive strategy in this Comment.
However, I believe that that perspective is much more suitable to understanding legal
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inadequate, but I do not suggest that it is without value. His analysis provides
numerous inventive examples that powerfully illuminate the difference
between consequentialist and nonconsequentialist explanations. Moreover,
many of his arguments are plausible components of a nonconsequentialist
account – for example, his emphasis on whether a liberty (or harm) implicates
the personal plans or projects of the actor (or victim), and his attention to
autonomy and subordination. However, some of the most difficult issues,
especially the question of how to justify attention to consequences within a
largely deontological or nonconsequentialist perspective, are more
convincingly analyzed by other moral and legal philosophers.104

practice, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 45-86 (1986), than to solving the problems
of metaethics, reconciling free will and responsibility, or justifying moral duties.
104 See KAMM, supra note 86, at 91-224; ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA
149-294 (1974); SCANLON, supra note 86, at 89-121; Larry Alexander, Deontology at the
Threshold, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893, 893-912 (2000); Michael S. Moore, Patrolling the
Borders of Consequentialist Justifications: The Scope of Agent-Relative Obligations, 27 L.
& PHIL. 35, 35-96 (2007); Amartya Sen, Rights and Agency, 11 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 3-39
(1982). See generally Larry Alexander & Michael Moore, Deontological Ethics, THE
STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
PHILOSOPHY
(Fall
2008),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/ethics-deontological
(discussing
the
relationship between deontological and consequentialist norms).
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